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 I. Introduction and related literature 
In recent years, the United States has been engaged in a heated debate about 
whether to replace part of the current, defined benefit (DB) Social Security system with 
a system of defined contribution (DC) personal accounts.  In 2005, President Bush gave 
speeches in numerous cities and towns advocating a reform that included these 
individual accounts.  Both proponents and opponents of individual accounts have 
emphasized the stark differences between the current defined benefit system and a 
system with individual accounts.  The mechanics and outcomes of the two systems 
seem to be quite different, and their goals are usually presented as diametrically 
opposed.   
Advocates of preserving the current system (predominantly Democrats) are 
committed to four core goals that stem from regarding Social Security as social 
insurance: (1) social security should redistribute wealth from those who have earned 
more over their whole working lives to those who have earned less, (2) different 
generations should share the risks of aggregate shocks,  (3) workers should be insured 
against inflation and long life with indexed life annuities, and (9) there should be limited 
opportunity for individuals to make mistakes that would lower their standard of living 
during retirement. 
Advocates of shifting to a personal account system for Social Security 
(predominantly Republicans) base their support on a commitment to a set of core goals 
that stem from a desire for real social security, specifically (4) ownership by individuals 
of tangible assets that cannot be revoked by a future government, (5) transparency 
regarding accrual of those assets, so that workers know what they own, (6) market 
valuations of assets as they are accrued so that rational planning for retirement can 
take place outside of social security and so that (7) workers know how much their 
wages are being taxed or subsidized by the social security system, (8) equity-like 
returns on at least some of those assets, and (10) the opportunity for individuals to 
make choices about the allocation of assets in their portfolio. 
Our purpose is to find common ground between these two approaches that 
preserves the core goals (1)-(8) of each, while compromising on portfolio choice (9) 
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versus (10).  We show that it is perfectly possible to convert social security into a 
system of personal accounts, with irrevocable ownership of market priced assets, while 
at the same time redistributing benefits based on lifetime income and sharing risks 
across generations.  We call this system progressive personal accounts.  Moreover, we 
envisage this system of progressive personal accounts automatically balancing the 
social security budget. 
There are two crucial ingredients in progressive personal accounts.  First, 
benefits would be awarded in the form of a new kind of derivative security that pays a 
worker a life annuity that is proportional to the economy-wide average labor earnings in 
his (statutory) retirement year.  We call this security a Personal Annuitized Average 
Wage security, or PAAW.  This security explicitly delivers payouts that achieve risk 
sharing across generations, since retiree benefits move in lock step with worker wages.  
Second, PAAWs would be awarded based on worker contributions plus a government 
match that is more favorable for workers with low lifetime earnings.  This variable match 
redistributes wealth, transferring benefits from those households with high realized 
lifetime earnings to households in the same generation which have low lifetime 
earnings.1 
Opposition to personal accounts has arisen in part from the belief that personal 
accounts would necessarily violate desiderata (1)-(3).  We show that on the contrary, 
progressive personal accounts are consistent with (1)-(3).  Furthermore, we envisage 
active market trading in PAAWs, and thus a continuously evolving market price for 
PAAWs, giving PAAW owners a market rate of return.  We shall argue that progressive 
personal accounts also satisfy Republican goals (4)-(8). Thus they provide a clear 
starting point for a bipartisan effort to reform and improve the current Social Security 
system.2    
A growing number of countries have moved away from the pay-as-you-go type 
social security system still used in the United States.  Some countries (e.g. Chile) have 
                                                 
1 Wealth redistribution from high lifetime earners to low lifetime earners can also be regarded as intra-
generational risk sharing. 
 
2 Of course, care must be exercised in the implementation, as there is a danger that support for 
progressive personal accounts might get transmuted during the political process into support for 
traditional personal accounts that hold only stocks and bonds and have no government match. 
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moved toward traditional individual account systems.  Others (Sweden, Italy, and a 
number of other European countries) have adopted notional defined contribution 
accounts in which participants have “notional” account balances that earn a “notional” 
rate of return, typically tied to the growth rate of wages.  While progressive personal 
accounts bear some relation to each of these, we argue that progressive personal 
accounts are distinctly superior.  First, they retain the intra-generational redistribution / 
risk-sharing missing from both traditional personal accounts and notional accounts.  
Second, they retain inter-generational risk-sharing, which traditional personal accounts 
do not.  Third, they provide account balances that correspond to market value, and 
returns that are market rates of return, whereas notional accounts do not.   For these 
reasons, progressive personal accounts would put the United States system back in the 
vanguard of managing lifetime financial security. 
Our paper proceeds as follows.   We begin with a brief overview of the tax and 
benefit rules of the current system.  Next, we define a PAAW as a security that pays its 
designee one inflation-corrected dollar for every year of his life after a fixed date tR (the 
year he hits the statutory retirement age), multiplied by the economy-wide average 
wage at tR.  PAAWs are of course new and unfamiliar securities, but they are not 
fundamentally different from a host of other derivative securities introduced by Wall 
Street in recent years.  A household holding PAAWs is sharing risk with the next 
generation, since higher wages for young workers in the future would imply larger 
PAAW dividends.  The PAAWs also protect against long life and inflation, since at 
retirement they turn into indexed annuities. 
Having defined a PAAW, we next show that the social security benefits promised 
under the current system can be neatly summarized by the number of PAAWs a 
household is entitled to.  The current system is akin to a system of personal accounts in 
which households accrue nothing until retirement, and then (based on their lifetime 
earnings) suddenly accrue a large number of PAAWs that they can never sell.  By 
specifying an accrual rule that enables households to accumulate PAAWs as they work, 
we show that it is possible to create a system of progressive personal accounts that 
gives retired workers the same benefits as the current system, and also gives them 
property rights over their PAAWs before retirement.  At the very least, this demonstrates 
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that there is no inherent contradiction between the current defined benefits system and 
an appropriately structured personal account system.  
We explicitly describe two accrual rules specifying how workers might acquire 
ownership of PAAWs over their working lives.  Both lead to ownership of the same 
number of PAAWs at retirement as is promised by the current social security benefit 
formula.  The “fastest” accrual rule allocates property rights over PAAWs at the fastest 
rate consistent with never having to take back a PAAW and reaching the current benefit 
formula at retirement no matter what earnings history materializes.  Though the “fastest” 
accrual rule is the simplest, we recommend instead an alternative called the “straight 
line” accrual rule because it makes the real tax or subsidy social security imposes on 
worker wages more transparent.  
Next we describe how a market in PAAWs could be developed.  We argue that 
PAAWs should be pooled, similar to the way individual mortgages are pooled by the 
government agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and then traded.3  Investors would 
not buy individual PAAWs, but instead a pro rata share of a large pool of them.  To 
eliminate adverse selection, and to guarantee a large, liquidly traded market, we would 
oblige all households to sell a small fixed percentage (e.g. 10%) of their newly acquired 
PAAWs into the pools.  A liquid PAAWs market would establish a market price for 
PAAWs, bringing the added transparency that comes with reliable valuations of assets. 
PAAWs are tangible assets and thus, once accrued, difficult to revoke (4).  Their 
accumulation in personal accounts would make benefits already accrued completely 
transparent (5).  Once PAAWs became reliably priced by the market, the government 
could even less easily expropriate the PAAWs held in personal accounts because 
households would know exactly how much money they were losing (4).  PAAW prices 
would enable individuals to compute a market value balance sheet to facilitate their 
financial planning (6).  If the allocation of PAAWs per dollar of tax contributions followed 
the straight-line rule we describe later, then workers would quickly and easily see the 
true average match rate they faced (the percentage difference between the value of the 
additional PAAWs added to their social security accounts and the social security taxes 
                                                 
3 Agency mortgage pools (in contrast to subprime mortgages) have been one of the most successful 
innovations in U.S. financial history.  
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they paid), and statements could provide information on the marginal match rate as 
well, giving the system much more transparency than it has now (7).  And over long 
time periods (e.g. 30 years), the increase in wages and the stock market are highly 
correlated.  Thus over long horizons PAAWs would earn equity-like returns (8), while in 
the short run being far less volatile than equities as the worker approaches retirement.4 
We also point out some additional benefits of a market for PAAWs.  A liquid 
PAAWs market would enable the government to observe the market value of its new 
promises and its accrued social security liabilities.  We argue that market value is a 
better and less arbitrary measure of liabilities than actuarial value.  Moreover, a market 
for PAAWs would likely lead to a watershed in advancing annuities markets and other 
retirement markets. 
At the same time, by forcing personal accounts to retain 90% of their PAAWs, 
including those awarded by the government match, we ensure that benefits are very 
similar to those of the current system and that households with smaller lifetime earnings 
get proportionately higher benefits (1).  The holding of PAAWs also embodies the 
Democrats’ desire for inter-generational risk-sharing (2) and inflation-hedged life 
annuities (3).  Of course 90% is an arbitrary figure that could be negotiated.  
Republicans would tend to prefer more choice, and thus a lower number, and 
Democrats might prefer an even higher number.5 
The last part of our paper takes up the question of budget balance, at the 
household level and for the system as a whole.  Since the current Social Security 
system contains no budget balance mechanism at either level, a progressive personal 
accounts system that mimics the contributions and payouts of the current system would 
not either.  We argue that social security should be made self-balancing at the 
aggregate level. This is especially important for plans such as this one that lock in 
                                                 
4 The fact that PAAWs earn equity-like returns does not imply that shifting to personal accounts (these or 
traditional ones) would raise overall rates of return on Social Security contributions.  See Geanakoplos, 
Mitchell, and Zeldes (1998) and the discussion in Section IV below. 
 
5 If the only source of market-traded PAAWs were sales from personal accounts, then the percent of 
PAAWs retained in accounts should be set low enough to lead to a liquid market in PAAWs.  However, as 
we describe later, the government could instead issue extra individual PAAWs and sell them directly to 
pools in financial markets, leaving open the possibility that a liquid PAAW market could be created even 
with workers retaining 100% of their PAAWs.  
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benefits by enhancing property rights on accrued benefits.  We describe a system such 
that workers pay for their PAAWs with their social security taxes, augmented or reduced 
by a government match similar in spirit to that arising from the straight line accrual rule 
under the current benefit rules.  But we impose the constraint that the total value of 
social security taxes should be equal to the total value of PAAWs awarded. 
To make the discussion concrete, and since PAAWs are not currently marketed, 
we undertake a back-of-the-envelope calculation of their value.  We simplify the 
calculation considerably by assuming risk-neutrality and computing expected values of 
payouts, but in related work (Geanakoplos and Zeldes, 2008) we treat valuation more 
thoroughly and specifically incorporate the effects of systematic market risk.   
Once we obtain estimated market prices for pooled PAAWs of every vintage, we 
can value accrued PAAWs, and compare these numbers to the dollar contributions that 
generate the accruals.  We define the government match for a household as the 
difference between the dollar value of extra PAAW accruals and the dollar value of the 
extra contributions generating those accruals, and the match rate as the match divided 
by the contributions.  Depending on the accrual rule, this match rate may vary from year 
to year for the same household. 
The match rates for any accrual rule that mimics the current system are non-zero 
for five reasons: a) the current system is not self-balancing, i.e. there is a disconnect 
between contributions and benefit rules, which Congressional interventions have often 
worsened, b) the current pay-as-you-go system uses part of current contributions to pay 
off the legacy debt incurred by the early generations who received benefits far in excess 
of their contributions, c) in the current system, the aggregate number of PAAWs 
accrued in any given year does not depend on the aggregate level of current social 
security contributions or on future wages, hence to the extent that current contributions 
are unusually low (high) and to the extent it can be foreseen that future wages will be 
much higher (or lower), accrued PAAWs will likely be worth more (or less) than 
contributions, d) depending on the speed of accrual, households might get better or 
worse annual deals when they are young or old, e) in the current system, households 
with low lifetime earnings receive more PAAWs per dollar of contributions. 
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There are a number of ways to make the system self-balancing, each of which 
will by necessity alter the risk-sharing (and match rates) built into the current system.  
We propose a mechanism that ensures aggregate fiscal balance “on the way in”, i.e. 
that sets the market value of annual aggregate accrued PAAWs equal to annual 
contributions, but that retains all the desiderata (1)-(8).  This mechanism would 
eliminate reasons a), b) and c) for non-zero household match rates, but retain reason 
e), and possibly reason d) as well.  This is consistent with the principle that households 
making low lifetime contributions (because of low lifetime incomes) should get a positive 
government match, and households with high contributions should get a negative 
government match.  Fiscal balance “on the way out” could be ensured by requiring the 
government, or the private sector, to use the social security trust fund to hedge social 
security liabilities.    
As part of ensuring fiscal balance on the way in, we would first recognize the 
legacy debt of the current system by giving PAAWs to all workers and retirees 
according to what they have already accrued under the old rules.  (Naturally what this 
amounts to requires explanation.)  This would represent new explicit debt to the 
government.  The government could finance future interest and principal payments both 
by issuing new Treasury debt (i.e. rolling over the debt) and by raising general taxes.  In 
this way the legacy debt would be removed from the social security system and be paid 
by all (current and future) entities subject to general taxes, like corporations and 
investors earning dividend income, and not just by workers.  We calculate that this tax 
would amount to about 1% on all income.  Then, every year from now on, households 
would have to pay for their own PAAWs with their social security contributions, except 
that the government match would redistribute contributions from workers with high 
lifetime earnings to those with low lifetime earnings.  In the aggregate, the social 
security system would then be fully funded and automatically balanced “on the way in”.  
We estimate that at the current time, workers would be able to afford to buy just about 
the same benefits that they are implicitly accruing in the current social security system.  
The 1% general tax would thus enable a social security system that was in balance now 
and that would automatically stay in balance “on the way in” in the future.  Over time, of 
course, the market value of the outstanding PAAWs would diverge from their original 
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price.  The government would have to hedge this risk, or as we explain below, engage 
the private sector in doing so.  
 
Related Literature 
Our work is related to and builds on a number of other papers in the literature. 
Feldstein and Samwick (1992) and Cushing (2005) compute the implicit marginal tax 
rate of the current U.S. Social Security system.  Below, we show the relationship 
between their calculations of marginal tax rates and our calculations of marginal match 
rates. Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1999) discuss alternative ways to compute 
accrued social security benefits, and Jackson (2004) describes a system of accrual 
accounting that he argues would more clearly describe social security’s financial 
situation.  Feldstein and Liebman (2002) analyze the redistributive features of an 
individual account plan with a two-tier contribution structure in which part of the inflows 
are proportional to earnings and part are lump-sum contributions.  Vickrey (1947) and 
Liebman (2003) discuss the advantages of basing taxation on lifetime rather than 
annual income.  Valdes-Prieto (2000), Borsch-Supan (2005), and Auerbach and Lee 
(2006) analyze notional DC systems, such as those adopted in Sweden and Germany, 
and the self-adjustment mechanisms built into them.   
A number of papers have proposed the creation of related new financial 
securities.  For example, Shiller (1993) proposes GDP-linked securities, Blake and 
Burrows (2001) proposes longevity or survivor bonds, and Bohn (2002) and Goetzmann 
(2005) propose aggregate wage-related securities. Valdes-Prieto (2005) advocates 
creating “pay-as-you-go securities” (which would securitize the part of future social 
security contributions that represents a net tax), and using them as a basis for social 
security reform. 
 
II. The mechanics of progressive personal accounts  
In this section, we first briefly describe how the current U.S. Social Security 
system works, i.e. the tax and benefit rules.  We then show that it is possible to create a 
system of individual accounts that exactly replicates the current system.  This means 
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that personal accounts can be compatible with progressivity and intergenerational risk 
sharing. 
In the current system the benefits received by social security contributors are 
based on a concave function of lifetime earnings, providing smaller increments in 
benefits with each additional dollar of lifetime earnings.  While personal accounts as 
typically implemented eliminate this progressivity, we show that this need not be the 
case.  Personal accounts can be made progressive simply by making annual PAAW 
accruals depend on the size of accumulated past accruals.  Later in the paper, we show 
that this is equivalent to providing a variable government match (positive or negative) 
where the size of the match depends on accumulated accruals to date.  
Personal accounts, by virtue of being personal, would also seem to eliminate the 
intergenerational risk sharing that is built into the current system.  In the current system, 
retiree benefits depend on the wages of the next generations of workers.  As the young 
do better, so will the old, and vice versa.  If the personal accounts hold stocks and 
bonds it is quite possible that retiree benefits will move in the opposite direction from 
wages, at least for some cohorts.  But there is no reason the personal accounts should 
be confined to traditional investment securities.  We explain that by holding PAAWs, 
retirees will receive payouts that move in the same direction as the wages of the next 
generation of workers. 
 
A.  The current system 
We start by describing the current contribution and benefit rules for the U.S. 
Social Security system; we ignore adjustments that would have to occur in the event 
that the system is unable to meet its obligations.  For simplicity, we focus on an 
individual who will be single and childless throughout life, who will not become disabled, 
and who will retire at the “normal retirement age” specified by Social Security.6 
Program rules mandate that individuals and their employers together contribute 
12.4 percent of all “covered” earnings, defined as earnings below the social security 
earnings cap (the annual earnings cap equaled $102,000 in 2008).  No contributions are 
                                                 
6  See Section C2 below for a sketch of how the analysis could be extended to include spouses and 
children (and their associated program benefits), as well as early or delayed retirement.  
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collected on earnings above the cap.  Of the 12.4 percent, 1.8 percentage points are 
earmarked for disability coverage.  In the analysis that follows, we ignore DI coverage, 
and therefore use a social security contribution rate of 10.6 percent.   
The benefits under the current system are a function of the worker’s lifetime 
“covered” earnings history.  An important feature of the system is that it is “wage-
indexed”: (1) the earnings that enter the benefit function are individual earnings in any 
year divided by average economy-wide earnings in that year, (2) initial benefits upon 
retirement are scaled by average economy-wide earnings in the statutory retirement 
year, and (3) the earnings cap and the “bend points” defined below are adjusted so that 
their ratios to the average economy-wide earnings remain constant over time.7   As a 
result, the system can be described more easily and clearly by defining a set of 
“relative” variables that are equal to the dollar amounts divided by average economy-
wide earnings for the year.  We define relative earnings for a worker in any year t as his 
current covered earnings for that year divided by average economy-wide earnings, and 
average relative earnings as the average of his highest 35 values of relative earnings.8 
 We can use these variables to describe the promised benefit structure of the 
current U.S. Social Security system.  Initial relative benefits are defined by the concave 
function of average relative earnings given in figure 1a.  Initial relative benefits are equal 
to 90% of average relative earnings that are less than .24, plus 32% of average relative 
                                                 
7 Average economy-wide earnings for a given year is the average across workers of annual labor 
earnings in that year.  (We use the terms “labor income”, “wage income”, “labor earnings”, “earnings”, and 
“wages” interchangeably in this paper). SSA’s measure of average economy-wide earnings is the 
Average Wage Index (AWI).  They compute the AWI sequentially, by first constructing a “raw earnings 
growth rate” g(t), and using this to construct the next AWI level, i.e. AWI(t) = (1+g(t)) * AWI(t-1).  Various 
techniques have been used over time to construct the raw earnings growth rate. Since 1991, the Social 
Security Administration has calculated the “raw” growth based on employer-reported W-2 forms, summing 
all earnings (including amounts above the Social Security earnings cap), including deferred 
compensation, less distributions, and dividing by the total number of earners.  From 1985 to 1990, the 
measure excluded deferred compensation and distributions. Prior to 1985, growth was calculated using 
earnings measurements provided by the Internal Revenue Service.  Because the SSA has used varied 
methods to compute earnings growth, the current level of the AWI series does not equal the level of “raw” 
average earnings computed by the SSA.  Under the current computation method, the AWI is about 4% 
larger than the “raw” series.  See Clingman and Kunkel (1992), Donkar (1981), and SSA (2006). Benefits 
after retirement are indexed to the Consumer Price Index.  
 
8 We ignore for simplicity the program rule that, in calculating average earnings over a career, earnings 
prior to age 60 are indexed forward to age 60 wage levels using Social Security’s Average Wage Index, 
while earnings from age 60 and after are included at their nominal levels.  Our definition assumes all 
earnings are indexed. 
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earnings between .24 and 1.35, plus 15% of average relative earnings between 1.35 
and 1.99.9 
A worker’s initial dollar benefits (also referred to as the Primary Insurance 
Amount or PIA) are paid at his statutory “normal retirement age” (NRA).  They are equal 
to initial relative benefits multiplied by average economy-wide earnings in that year. 
Benefits in subsequent years are indexed to the CPI, so that individuals receive a 
constant stream of real benefits for as long as they live.  
Another way of describing the initial relative benefit function is to say that by the 
end of their working lives, workers will fall into one of three lifetime earnings categories, 
and that the marginal benefit a worker receives per dollar contributed in taxes depends 
on his category.  If a worker about to retire had increased his relative earnings in any 
one previous year by Δ, he would have made extra tax contributions of Δ x 10.6% 
(assuming a social security tax of 10.6%) measured in average wage units.  (His dollar 
contribution would be that number multiplied by the economy-wide average wage for the 
year).  According to the formula just described above, the worker thereby would have 
increased his lifetime average relative earnings by Δ/35.  For a worker with very low 
lifetime earnings, this would have increased his initial relative benefits by .9 x Δ/35, as in 
figure 1A.  For this worker, the extra initial benefit per additional contribution (measured 
in relative wage units is) (.9 x Δ/35)/( Δ x 10.6%) ≈ .24.  For a worker with somewhat 
higher lifetime earnings, the corresponding number is (.32 x Δ/35)/( Δ x 10.6%) ≈ .09.  
For a higher earnings worker, the number is (.15 x Δ/35)/( Δ x 10.6%) ≈ .04.10  We 
present these marginal benefit brackets in figure 2a. 
Note that since benefits are determined by relative earnings, a temporary and 
proportional increase in the earnings of all workers in any year t will leave unchanged 
the benefits that those workers receive when they retire in year tR > t.  The benefits of 
individuals reaching the statutory retirement age in year t would be proportionately 
higher in year t and each year they live thereafter.  
 
                                                 
9 The points at which the slope of the line change are referred to as “bend points”. We ignore here the 
rule that individuals must earn income in a minimum of 40 quarters in order to receive benefits.  
 
10 This exercise assumes that the increase Δ in relative earnings occurred in one of the 35 highest 
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B. Defining new securities -- PAAWs 
We define a Personal Annuitized Average Wage security or PAAW as a security 
that pays its owner one inflation-corrected dollar for every year of his life after a fixed 
date tR (the year he hits the statutory retirement age R), multiplied by the economy-wide 
average wage at tR.  PAAWs are tied to specific individuals (i) and to the year of the first 
payout on the security (tR), and we use the notation PAAW(i,tR) to capture this. 
We also define two other securities that could help in the construction and pricing 
of PAAWs.  First, we define a PANT(i, tR) (personal annuity unit) as a person-i-specific 
“year tR  annuity unit” as a security that pays one dollar in year tR and one inflation-
adjusted dollar in every subsequent year that the individual i is alive.  Second, we define 
an Average Wage(t) Security as a security with a single payout in year t equal to the 
average economy-wide earnings in that year.  An alternative way of describing a PAAW 
is that it is a composite security that pays off one PANT(i,tR) for every dollar paid in year 
tR by the Average Wage(tR) Security.   
A PAAW (as well as a PANT or an Average Wage Security) is a derivative 
security, similar to countless others that have been created in recent years by Wall 
Street.  Because the security is partly an annuity, it provides insurance for long life, 
paying every year until death.  Furthermore, because the payment depends on the 
average wage at retirement, it creates risk sharing across generations.  If young 
workers are doing well and receiving high wages, the old will get higher payoffs from 
their PAAWs, and conversely.   
 
C. Translating the current system into an equivalent DC system 
We are now in a position to translate the current system into an equivalent 
defined contribution system, i.e. to show that by choosing a particular variable match, 
and restricting accounts to hold PAAWs, it is possible to create a system of progressive 
personal accounts that exactly mimics the promised taxes and payouts of the current 
system.  Replicating the current system may not be the best way to implement 
individual accounts, but it serves as a starting point that allows one to compare and 
contrast the current system (translated into the language of DC) with the more standard 
                                                                                                                                                             
relative-earnings years (otherwise there would be no incremental benefit).  
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DC systems typically proposed.  We argue that this is an important step toward 
improving communication between the two sides of the current social security debate, 
potentially easing the political gridlock that has occurred in the U.S.  
In order to replicate the current system, workers would receive PAAWs in 
exchange for their social security contributions, which they would hold in their personal 
accounts; workers would be prohibited from selling them.  Later we consider both the 
advantages and disadvantages of allowing workers to sell some of their PAAWs in 
exchange for other financial securities, and also the advantages of observing a public 
market price for PAAWs. 
To replicate the current system, workers and employers would (as in the current 
system) together contribute 10.6 percent of earnings up to the earnings cap. The 
government would credit each individual’s account with a number of PAAWs; the exact 
number credited would depend (in a way to be specified) on current and past 
contributions.  At the normal retirement age, each PAAW would pay off a dollar amount 
equal to the average wage in the economy in that year, and then in every subsequent 
year of life, the same inflation-indexed real payment.11 
The current system redistributes from rich to poor on the basis of lifetime income, 
through the computation of benefits at the age of retirement.  A natural question is 
whether we can replicate this redistribution in personal accounts, where the benefits are 
irrevocably owned by the account as they are earned, long before one’s lifetime 
earnings can be measured.  At first glance this seems impossible.  But we show that by 
making new accruals depend on accumulated balances, as well as new contributions, 
we can indeed achieve the lifetime redistribution in the current system.  
1. Computing accrued balances (total and incremental) 
We define PBALit to be the number of units of PAAWs(i,tR) accrued by worker i 
as of year t. There are actually many rules for the accumulation of balances PBALit that 
can replicate the current system.  The simplest is to define PBALit as the benefits 
worker i would be entitled to under the current system given his earnings history up 
through year t, and assuming all his future earnings were zero.  Clearly with such a 
                                                 
11 Equivalently, at retirement each PAAW is transformed into a number of PANTs equal to the economy-
wide average wage that year. 
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definition PBALit can rise, but can never fall. There are other methods of accrual that 
also end with the same amount at retirement and never fall, but among them our 
definition accumulates balances most rapidly.  We shall call it the fastest accrual rule. 
Later in this section, we examine a second accrual rule that we refer to as straight-line 
accrual.  
Under the “fastest accrual rule” definition, progressive personal accounts can be 
described by simply changing the units on the axes in figures 1a and 2a.  These are 
presented in figures 1b and 2b.  For figure 1b, the Y-axis is now relabeled as PBAL.  
For figure 2b, the Y-axis is “additional PAAWs per additional contribution” and the X-
axis is PBAL.   (Since the PBAL function defined in Figure 1b is strictly monotone in 
average relative wage, we can replace each average relative wage on the X axis of 
Figure 2a with the corresponding PBAL, giving Figure 2b.)  Figure 2b shows the extra 
PAAWs divided by the extra contributions that together arise from working an additional 
hour (holding constant the number of years of work), as a function of how many PAAWs 
have already been accumulated.  Additional PAAWs per additional contribution 
(measured in relative wages units) is a decreasing function of PBAL, falling from .24 to 
.09 to .04 as PBAL increases from less than .2 to more than .54.12 
It might have seemed that our definition of PBALit would need to be a function of 
all of worker i’s relative wages before year t.  But Figure 2b makes clear that PBALit can 
be rewritten as a function of just (PBALit-1, Contribution(t)), provided that for a 
contribution coming after the first 35 years, only the excess of that contribution over the 
35th highest relative contribution to date counts toward PAAW accrual.    
PAAW accrual replicates the redistribution in the current system, and PAAW 
accrual is a function of 1) new contributions and 2) accumulated balances PBAL.  This 
definition of PAAW accrual shows that we can award irrevocable benefits to young 
workers and yet still make total benefits accrued at retirement depend on lifetime 
earnings. 
We illustrate how this accrual works in four examples, based on different 
assumed age - relative earnings profiles.  For worker 1 (the “economy average” worker), 
                                                 
12 In the current system there is a 10 year vesting period, so we are referring here to workers in their 11th 
year, or to workers in earlier years if we ignore the vesting requirement. 
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we assume that earnings equal average economy-wide earnings in every year, i.e. that 
relative earnings equal 1.  For worker 2, (the “average earner worker”) we assume 
relative earnings at each age equal average relative earnings at the same age for the 
cohort of men born in 1937.13  For worker 3 (the “low earner” worker), we suppose that 
relative earnings equal one-half the relative earning of worker 2.  For worker 4 (the “high 
earner” worker), we assume that relative earnings are 1.5 times the relative earnings of 
worker 2.  Our results are shown in Figures 3-5.14 
Figure 3 plots additional PAAWs per additional relative contribution against time, 
for each of the four workers.  This can be interpreted as the extra PAAWs per unit of 
extra contribution that would accrue from working an extra hour (holding constant the 
number of years worked) now plotted against age.  This graph shows how fast workers 
move along the schedule in Figure 2b. The average earner and the high earner both 
eventually move down to the .04 ratio, but the high earner worker gets there sooner.   
The economy average worker and the low earner worker never earn enough to move all 
the way to the .04 ratio. (The economy average worker starts at .24 ratio, and ends in 
the .09 ratio.  The low earner worker does the same, but takes longer to get to the .09 
ratio.)  Notice that there is no drop after 35 years, because earnings late in life are 
always greater than or equal to the 35th highest. 15  Hence, on the margin, an additional 
contribution would yield the full additional benefit.  
Note that extra PAAWs are accrued due to increases in relative earnings (and 
contributions).  If the earnings of all workers rise proportionately (due to either higher 
work hours or higher wages per hour), relative earnings remain unchanged and 
therefore workers will not accrue any additional PAAWs as a result of this change.  
In Figure 4, we illustrate the annual change in PAAW balances at each age for 
the four workers.  These graphs measure absolute increments over the year, rather 
                                                 
13  We are grateful to Seung An from the Social Security Administration for providing us with the data on 
average cohort earnings.  These men earned more than the economy wide average at every age over 28. 
 
14 Although we have not done so, our approach could easily be extended to examine realizations of a 
stochastic earnings process 
 
15 Note that it is purely by coincidence that worker 2 (cohort average) accumulates enough PAAWs to 
drop to the .04 ratio at exactly the same date that the worker has worked 35 years.  Thus the drop after 
age 54 in figure 3 for worker 2 is unrelated to having worked 35 years at that point.  
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than the increment per unit of contribution as in figure 3. They therefore take into 
account the varying contributions due to the age profile of relative earnings. After year 
35, a large fraction of each contribution does not count toward accrual – all that counts 
toward accrual is the difference between relative earnings and the 35th highest relative 
earnings. 
Finally, in Figure 5, we look at the level of accrued PAAW balances (PBAL) 
versus age.  The average worker (worker 1) accumulates enough securities to receive 
about 44 percent of the average wage in his first year of retirement.  The cohort average 
worker (worker 2) accumulates enough securities to receive almost 60 percent of the 
average wage in his first year of retirement.  The fact that this is less than twice the 36 
percent accumulated by the low earner worker 3 (who earns half as much) illustrates 
again the redistribution in the system.  
 
2.  Incorporating other social security benefits and features into 
progressive personal accounts 
In the analysis above, we focused on single individuals with no children who 
retired at the normal retirement age with no chance of disability.  We also ignored the 
requirement that only workers with 40 quarters of positive earnings are eligible to collect 
retirement benefits.  We could extend our analysis to incorporate these minimum work 
requirements, as well as spousal benefits, survivor benefits, early or delayed retirement, 
and disability.  For example, the accrual rules could be changed so that all PAAWs  
become vested only after 40 quarters of work.  In addition, spousal benefits could be 
implemented through the creation of a separate spousal account.  To replicate the 
current system, the accrual of PAAWs in this account would depend on the current 
contributions of both the individual and the spouse, as well as the accumulated 
balances of each individual.  The accounts would become vested only after 10 years of 
marriage to match the requirement in the current system that divorced spouses must 
have been married for 10 years or more to receive spousal benefits. Finally, individuals 
wishing to retire later than age tR (the NRA) could be allowed to use their PAAW 
payouts in the years immediately following tR to purchase additional PAAWs, and those 
wishing to retire earlier than age tR could be allowed to sell some of their PAAWs to 
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provide retirement income during the years prior to tR.  These transactions could occur 
at pre-specified prices (to correspond to the current system) or at market prices.  
 
3. The assignment of property rights to accrued benefits 
Under the current system, workers’ future social security benefits are not 
protected with formal legal property rights.  Congress can alter benefits, without regard 
to whether they have been implicitly accrued under the current system.16  Our approach 
would formally split future benefits into those accrued to date, and those yet to be 
accrued, giving property rights, and reduced political risk, to the former but not to the 
latter.  Workers would get periodic social security statements telling them their balance 
of PAAWs and their market value (assuming that there is a market for PAAWs, as we 
discuss below)  This treatment would enhance the ability of individuals to plan for their 
retirement.  It would also correspond more closely to the legal treatment of private and 
state and local defined benefit pension plans.17 
The assignment of property rights at the individual level leads to a natural choice 
of accounting method for the system as a whole: accrual accounting.  Under this 
method, the present value of new accruals would be reported directly on the income 
statement of social security.  This would make the present value costs of a legislative 
increase in social security benefits much more transparent than under the current 
system (see Jackson, 2004, for a discussion of this and other advantages of accrual 
accounting).  As we describe later in the paper, the development of a liquid market in 
PAAWs would take this one step further by allowing the government to report the 
market value of new accruals (as opposed to an actuarial estimate of present value).   
Assigning property rights to accrued benefits has potential disadvantages as 
well.  In particular, it reduces the flexibility that future Congresses have to reduce 
                                                 
16 The 1935 Social Security Act stated “The right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this Act is 
hereby reserved to the Congress.”  The right of Congress to reduce or eliminate benefits that are 
scheduled to be paid as a result of previous Social Security contributions was re-affirmed by the 1960 
Supreme Court decision on Fleming v. Nestor.  See http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/nestor.html for 
further details. 
 
17 As in the current system, we would forbid the use of PAAWs held by workers in their private social 
security accounts as collateral for loans.  This is a necessary limitation on their property rights if we intend 
to preserve their social security savings for their old age. 
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benefits in response to unexpected shocks.  To reduce this cost, we propose later in the 
paper that the system be made self-balancing on a present value basis, so that 
decreases in revenue and increases in system costs are automatically compensated for 
by decreases in accruals.  We leave a full treatment of the advantages and 
disadvantages of assigning property rights to future work. 
 
4.  Alternative accrual rules 
As mentioned above, there are alternative accrual rules under which the benefits 
of young individuals accrue less rapidly.  The “fastest” accrual rule described above 
corresponds to the benefits an individual would end up with in the current system if he 
never worked again.  For some purposes, such as considering a transition to a 
completely new system, this accrual rule may be overly generous.  Young workers, 
even with maximal covered wages, accrue large numbers of PAAWs per contribution, 
because their accrual is equivalent to a poor worker who had steadily earned very low 
relative wages all through his life.  A worker whose average relative wage for the first s 
years is w would accrue f((w·s)/35) = f(w·(s/35)) PAAWs by the end of s years, where f 
is the initial relative benefits function, exactly equal to a worker who earned smaller 
relative wages of w·(s/35) per year but worked all 35 years.  We therefore consider a 
second accrual rule that we see as a natural alternative. 
Instead of taking the sum of relative wages to date and dividing by 35, compute 
the average relative earnings to date, put this value into the initial relative benefits 
formula, and then pro-rate the benefits by the fraction of years worked to date (based on 
an assumed 35 year work life).  A worker whose average relative wage for the first s 
years is w would then accrue f(w)·(s/35) PAAWs by the end of these years.  Since f is 
concave, with f(0) = 0, this second accrual is always smaller than the first, f(w)·(s/35) ≤ 
f(w·s/35) for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 35.  Figure 6 shows the accruals by age under each rule for a 
hypothetical worker who always earns relative wages of 1.75 for the 35 years between 
the ages of 20 and 55.   
The second accrual method has the great advantage of not treating high wage 
young people as if they were poor.  Also, as shown in Figure 6, a worker who earned a 
steady relative wage all his life would accrue the same number of additional PAAWs 
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each year, moving up the straight line.  For this reason we refer to this method as the 
“straight-line” accrual rule. 
This straight-line accrual method closely resembles that used by the Social 
Security Board of Trustees to calculate the maximum transition cost measure of 
unfunded obligations.18  The maximum transition cost measure is also the basis for 
Jackson’s (2004) analysis of accrual accounting. 
 
D. PAAWs vs. notional accounts 
A growing number of countries, most notably Sweden, Italy, and Poland, have 
recast their social security systems as notional accounts.  Participants in these systems 
make contributions to “notional” accounts, and the balances are legislated to earn an 
interest rate that is generally set as a function of wage growth.  At retirement, balances 
are converted to a life annuity, based on cohort survival probabilities. These accounts 
are called “notional” because balances do not correspond to any underlying assets and 
returns are not those of a financial instrument.  Notional accounts are by construction 
partially self-balancing (see Valdes-Prieto, 2000, and Auerbach and Lee, 2006).   
While PAAWs are similar in some ways to notional accounts, we think 
progressive personal accounts would represent a significant advance.  First, since 
PAAW accrual is based on a redistributive, concave formula (modeled on the current 
system), progressive personal accounts would retain the intra-generational risk sharing / 
redistribution of the current system, whereas notional accounts as typically implemented 
do not.  Second, and more fundamentally, since PAAWs are bona fide securities, they 
can be traded (as we will describe more clearly in the next section).  In our view, a 
balance should always correspond to market value and returns should correspond to 
market returns.  Market price, not notional balance, conveys useful information to 
account owners and to the stewards of the social security system.   
                                                 
18 The maximum transition cost measure of unfunded obligations equals the present value of accrued 
Social Security benefits payable after the current date, minus the present value of taxes on future benefits 
minus the value of the Trust Fund. Accrued benefits of participants who are currently working are 
calculated in the same manner as disability benefits (Goss, 1999), but then prorated by (age - 22) / 40 
(see SSA, 2007).  Benefit calculations for the maximum transition cost measure exclude the lowest n 
years of relative earnings, where n equals the whole-number portion of min(5, years_worked/5).  Our 
accrual rule is based on the highest 35 years of relative earnings, with no exclusions allowed if there are 
fewer than 35 years worked.  
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III. Trading PAAWs 
So far we have not allowed PAAWs to be traded or priced, and we have 
replicated the current DB system, including its intra and inter-generational risk sharing, 
with a system of progressive personal accounts.  This has the advantage over the 
current system of bestowing property rights over benefits as workers accrue them, 
meeting one of the goals of the Republican push to reform Social Security.  The PAAWs 
will also make the accrual of future benefits very transparent, in contrast to the 
opaqueness of the current system. 
The trading of PAAWs from individual accounts is a step that need not be taken.  
But if implemented in a measured way, it could provide further advantages.  
 
A. The benefits of a market for PAAWs 
The market price for PAAWs would provide important information to households, 
governments, and other market participants.   First, a market price for pooled PAAWs 
would give people information about the market value of their own PAAWs, helping 
them with their financial planning decisions regarding saving and asset allocation.  
Second, a market value would make it more difficult for the government to take them, 
thus further enhancing property rights. Third, the price of PAAWs would allow 
households to compare the value of their tax contributions with the value of their 
accrued assets.  Fourth, the price of PAAWs would give economists a reliable guide to 
the present value of the benefits promised by the social security system, a number that 
is currently quite controversial. It would also help in designing policies that make the 
system self-balancing.  Fifth, the trading and pricing of PAAWs would enable the private 
sector to play a more significant role in social security, as we shall see.  Sixth, as the 
pools of PAAWs mature, they turn into pools of individual annuities.  As such, they 
become a form of survivor or longevity bond that provide a market guide to aggregate 
mortality probabilities. 
There is another big indirect benefit from trading PAAWs.  The social security 
system embodies a gigantic contingent obligation from the government.  The economic 
system would be improved if a fraction of these obligations could be securitized and 
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priced and made available as collateral for other obligations.  PAAWs could be used as 
collateral for issuing further annuities.  We believe this would have a salutary effect on 
the annuities markets and the reverse mortgage markets, which at the moment are 
hobbled by inefficiencies and adverse selection. 
Until a few years ago, financial markets may not have been able to process these 
new securities.  But given the recent advances in structured finance, Wall Street should 
now be ready for them.  
 
B. Implementing the trade of PAAWs via pools 
One way to ensure volume in the trading and pricing of PAAWs would be to 
require owners of the personal accounts to sell a fixed percentage of their new PAAWs 
each year and purchase other securities with the proceeds. Workers would not be 
allowed to spend the proceeds prior to retirement, nor would they be allowed to use 
balances in their social security accounts (PAAWs or other securities) as collateral for 
loans.  They could either be required to purchase a specific basket of securities (for 
example a broad-based equity index fund) or allowed to choose the securities or 
baskets of securities that they wished to hold in their accounts.   
As discussed above, portfolio choice is a dimension along which Democrats and 
Republicans typically disagree.  Republicans see choice as beneficial, while Democrats 
see it as dangerous.  Here, a compromise is conceptually easy to work out; one simply 
restricts the degree of choice available within personal accounts. By keeping the 
percentage of PAAWs sold each year to be rather low (say at 10%), personal account 
holders would not be able to put the bulk of their social security benefits at risk.   
An alternative approach would be for individuals to retain 100% of their PAAWs, 
but for the government to issue extra individual PAAWs in proportion to those accrued 
that year, and to sell these PAAWs directly to pools in financial markets.  The 
government could use the proceeds of the sale to retire other, more traditional, forms of 
debt.  Under this approach, the payouts from individual’s accounts would continue to 
mimic those promised by the current system.  
PAAWs (and PANTs) are individual-specific securities, paying as long as the 
individual lives, so trading them presents many liquidity and adverse selection 
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problems.  They are thus analogous to individual mortgages, whose payments depend 
on the individual’s decision to prepay or default (in which case the payoff also depends 
on the individual’s home resale value).  In the mortgage market these problems have 
been overcome by the pooling of securities, and that is what we propose for PAAWs.  
To be marketed efficiently, PAAWs should be pooled, just like mortgages.  Investors in 
the pool would not buy a single PAAW, but a pro rata share of all the PAAWs in the 
pool.19 
Let us denote by Pool(t, tR) the collection of all PAAWs issued in year t to 
workers whose statutory retirement year is tR. This pool of PAAWs would consist of 
PAAWs(i, tR) issued to over 3 million workers i.  The prediction of PAAW payments for 
any one worker i is fraught with uncertainty; but the pool is much less uncertain in 
percentage terms. 
Assume for now that the personal account owners would be required to sell 
exactly the 10% of their newly accrued PAAWs we spoke of above.  These would be 
gathered into Pool(t, tR), and then shares would be sold off to investors, exactly as in 
the mortgage market.  A single price πt(t, tR) per PAAW would emerge for each pool, 
even though the individual PAAWs (i, tR) would pay off differently, depending on the 
idiosyncratic mortality of individual i.  In the mortgage market, different homeowners, 
with different propensities to prepay or to default, sell their individual specific promises 
into pools.  Shares in these pools are sold to the public.  Investors are enabled to hold 
liquid shares, and they need only predict the average default rates or prepayment rates 
for the pools, not individual specific rates.  The same would be true of pools of PAAWs.  
Investors would only need to predict average mortality rates, for example.  The shares 
could be resold later at any time s > t for price πs(t, tR). 
Once s ≥  tR , the pool of PAAWs effectively becomes a pool of PANTs.  These 
pooled PANTs would be a form of survivor or longevity bond.20  The current annuities 
market is so hobbled by adverse selection and thin markets that it is hard to obtain a 
                                                 
19 Rather than pooling all individuals together, one could imagine creating separate pools for men and 
women.  All else equal, the price of the pool of women’s PAAWs would be higher, due to women’s higher 
life expectancy.  To offset this, the government would likely want to set higher match rates for women.  
20  For more on survivor or longevity bonds, see, e.g., Blake and Burrows (2001) and the literature that 
followed. 
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market forecast about longevity.  The gigantic mandatory saving plan created by social 
security provides a remarkable opportunity to improve this situation.  The prices of the 
pools of PAAWs and PANTs would be an invaluable guide to private companies wishing 
to issue their own annuities, or reverse mortgages, making those markets more 
efficient.  It would also provide information about longevity to private firms with defined 
benefit pension obligations.  Annuity providers and DB pensions could hedge their 
exposure to longevity risk by holding shares of pooled PANTs. 
 
C. The private sector 
Until now, we have imagined PAAWs as securities issued by the government to 
individuals, with a fraction tradeable in pools among the general public.  But it is also 
possible that the private sector could issue a significant fraction, or even all, of the 
PAAWs.  A firm issuing x% of the total PAAWs P(t, tR) awarded in year t to workers 
reaching retirement age in year tR would be responsible for delivering x% of the benefits 
called for by that pool.21  Firms would compete with each other, offering to take on the 
PAAW liabilities for the lowest price per PAAW.  For every s ≥ t they would be required 
to keep a margin collateralizing their obligations, based on the price πs(t, tR) of the 
tradable government PAAWs of the same vintage.  Workers would receive PAAWs from 
the government and from private firms, but would only be allowed to sell the 
government issued PAAWs.22  The collateral requirement should guarantee that the 
privately issued PAAWs are just as secure as the government PAAWs.  One could 
further imagine creating a second pool PrivatePool(t, tR) of privately issued and tradable 
PAAWs in addition to the pool Pool(t, tR) of PAAWs issued by the government.  
 
 
 
                                                 
21 One complication is that a firm would have to rely on the government to inform it when workers in the 
pool died.  Information about deaths is also a requirement (and also sometimes a problem) for the current 
social security system. 
 
22 To insure the safety of payments to retirees, the government should be held responsible for making any 
payments the private sector failed to make.  This would provide the government with the incentive to set 
strong funding and collateral requirements. 
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IV.  Pricing PAAWs 
To determine what the market price of a PAAW would be if it were traded, we will 
need to introduce a model.23   We first examine the simplest model: one that assumes 
risk neutrality.  We then sketch out the beginnings of how one might construct a model 
to compute pricing under risk aversion, leaving the implementation of this for ongoing 
work.  
 
A.  Pricing PAAWs assuming risk neutrality 
Under risk neutrality, the value of an individual PAAW depends on assessments 
of 1) the growth in average wages, 2) the future path of interest rates, 3) individual 
survival probabilities.  For our calculations below, we assume a long-run growth in 
average real wages of 1.1% and a long-run real interest rate of 3%.24  We use the 
cohort life tables from Bell and Miller (2002) and assume for now that all individuals of 
the same age face the same conditional survival probabilities25, i.e. that there is no 
heterogeneity or private information about these probabilities.26  Finally we make the 
assumption that the individuals are fully rational and have the correct expectations of 
the average wage growth rate. 
Based on these assumptions, we compute an estimate of the market price 
πs(2000, 2047), measured in average wage units.  Figure 8 shows the estimated price 
of a PAAW across time (age) for individuals born in 1980, turning 20 in 2000, and hitting 
the statutory retirement age of 67 in 2047.  The market price of the PAAW, in date s 
average wage units, rises steadily as s approaches tR, because a) the probability of 
reaching the retirement age increases as any individual survives an additional year and 
                                                 
23 Of course, once the market is thriving, one could simply observe market prices.  But this still begs the 
question of how market participants would price PAAWs. 
 
24 These equal the intermediate cost assumptions in the 2005 Social Security Trustees Report.  The 
assumptions in the 2008 Trustees Report are virtually the same: growth in average real wages of 1.1% 
and real interest rate of 2.9%. 
 
25  For the calculations presented, we used the survival probabilities for males born in 1980. 
 
26 With heterogeneity in survival probabilities, the price of a representative pool of PAAWs would not give 
a perfect signal to individuals about the market value of their individual future retirement cash flows.  
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b) the real interest rate is greater than the growth in average real wages, so that one 
year’s less discounting has a bigger effect than the increasing value of a wage unit. 
Next, for each of the four representative workers, we compute (see Figure 9) the 
total projected market value of accrued PAAWs (measured in contemporaneous 
average wage units); i.e., the product of PAAW balances at any date s and the price at 
date s of a PAAW πs(2000, 2047).27  These rise over time, for example to a value of 6.7 
for the cohort average worker, meaning that the value of accrued balances at retirement 
is expected to be 6.7 times average economy-wide wages.  
 
B.  Allowing for risk aversion 
Pricing PAAWs by assuming risk neutrality could easily be misleading.  In 
ongoing work (Geanakoplos and Zeldes, 2008), we are examining model-based pricing 
allowing for risk aversion.  If PAAWs were a redundant security (i.e. the payoffs could 
be perfectly replicated by holding a basket of other traded securities), this would be a 
relatively straightforward task. For example, if the cash flows were always equal to the 
cash flows stemming from a certain number of shares of the S&P 500, plus a certain 
number of TIPS (Treasury Inflation Protected Securities), then one could simply price 
PAAWs by looking at the market price of the shares of the S&P 500 and the investment 
needed to acquire the TIPS.  Of course it is not possible to perfectly replicate PAAWs 
with securities that are currently marketed.  An alternative approach (followed in 
Geanakoplos and Zeldes, 2008) is to project the return on PAAWs onto the returns of 
currently traded securities and assume that the residual has price equal to zero.  
Goetzmann (2005) found that wage growth and stock returns are uncorrelated, or 
even slightly negatively correlated, over short periods of time. He concluded that stocks 
would not figure much in a replicating portfolio for wage-indexed liabilities.  While this 
might be true for wage-indexed securities with very short maturities, this would not be 
so for wage-indexed securities with long maturities. Common sense suggests that over 
the long run real wages and stock returns must be positively correlated.  For example, a 
permanent drop in future productivity would likely lead to both lower future real wages 
                                                 
27 Since we assumed that all workers have the same mortality, it follows that the prices of all accumulated 
PAAWs are the same, πs(t, 2047) = πs(2000, 2047) for all 2000 ≤ t ≤ s. 
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and a lower future value of the stock market, compared to what they would have been 
otherwise.  It is perfectly consistent that a rise in stock returns today does not signal a 
higher wage today, yet does make it more likely that wages in 30 years will be higher. 
Thus stocks would almost surely have a significant positive weight in the replicating 
portfolio at time t for PAAWs indexed to wages at time tR much greater than t.   As t 
approaches tR, the replicating portfolio would change and stocks would drop out.  In 
Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2008) we model this long run correlation, and use Monte 
Carlo derivative pricing methods to estimate the price of a PAAW.28 
An alternative approach to pricing PAAWs directly would be to first estimate the 
prices of the two underlying securities – Average Wage Securities and pools of PANTs, 
and then use these to price the composite PAAWs.  There is a literature in financial 
theory indicating how, under certain conditions, it is possible to dynamically trade the 
portfolios of two securities to replicate the product of the securities.29  We could apply 
this approach to obtain the price of PAAWs as a function of the prices of average wage 
bonds and pools of PANTs. 
If the best replicating portfolio of currently traded securities leaves a residual that 
cannot be assumed to have price zero, then one has to use an alternative asset pricing 
model to assess the value of the residual. There are several models available for this 
purpose, and one would need to check that the price of the residual is robust, or at least 
that upper and lower bounds could be sensibly computed.  We leave this for future 
work.  
Risk and return of PAAWs 
As just discussed, in the long run wage growth is correlated with stock market 
growth.  Hence if PAAWs are priced in the market, they must offer equity-like returns in 
the long run.30  But as workers age, and t approaches tR, PAAW volatility becomes very 
                                                 
28 This follows the work of Lucas and Zeldes (2006), who use this type of approach to estimate the market 
value of private defined-benefit pension liabilities (PBO measures).  
 
29  Amin and Bodurtha (1995) show how to price certain types of “quantos”: contingent claims with a 
“quantity” or nominal cash flow determined by equity values in one currency but paid in another currency 
at a fixed rate.   For example, the value of a first security, such as the Nikkei stock index, might determine 
the number of units of a second security, such as the U.S. dollar, that must be paid. 
30 This is consistent with Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes (1998).  Equity-like returns are a feature of 
PAAWs securities, but not necessarily of Social Security as a whole.  Achieving equity-like (or any 
market) returns for all of Social Security would first require eliminating its legacy debt, for example by 
 
 
27
low.  For example, when t = tR - 1, the only payoff uncertainty is over what next year’s 
real wage will be.  All future payoffs are determined by that same number, and by 
aggregate mortality.  By contrast, even if investors can be fairly confident of next year’s 
dividends, they will be very uncertain about dividends in 10 years, and stock prices at tR  
are quite uncertain at t = tR – 1.  If personal accounts hold only PAAWs, it will never 
happen that two different cohorts retiring one year apart will get 20% different retirement 
benefits, as could easily happen if investors kept their money in stocks and sold them 
for annuities at retirement.  PAAWs might thus turn out to be a more attractive 
investment vehicle than stocks for individuals planning for retirement.  
 
V.  The government match rate (under risk neutrality) 
Once PAAWs are priced, in any of the ways indicated above, we can compute 
the government “match” under the current social security system (which can be positive 
or negative, i.e. a subsidy or a tax) as the difference between the market value of 
PAAWs received and the value of the contribution.  The average match rate is defined 
as [πt(t, tR) * (Δ PBAL) / annual contribution] -1 and captures the percentage by which 
the social security system is subsidizing (or taxing if negative) account contributions in 
each year. The marginal match rate is defined as [πt(t, tR) * (increment to PBAL per 
additional dollar of contribution)] -1, i.e. the percent subsidy (or tax) for a marginal 
additional account contribution.  The match rate of course depends on which accrual 
rule (fastest or straight line) we use. 
Unlike most simple DC plans, the match rate is not constant across people or 
time.  It depends on PBAL, the price of a PAAW, and the fraction of a contribution that 
"counts".  The match rate can be positive or negative, but it can never be < -100% (i.e. 
balances cannot be taken away).  Note that all of the redistribution related to these 
accounts occurs on the way in (i.e. as contributions are made); none of it occurs while 
funds are earning returns or when they are withdrawn. 
Figures 10 and 11 show the average match rate and the marginal match rate, 
under the fastest accrual rule, for our representative workers, taking the price of PAAWs 
                                                                                                                                                             
increasing taxes outside of Social Security to pay off the interest and principle of the legacy debt.  See 
Section VI below.  
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derived earlier from our risk neutral model.  For the first 35 years of work, the average 
and marginal match rates are identical, with the exception of those rare years containing 
bend points.  On average over the life-cycle, the match rates are quite negative.  This 
corresponds to the fact that the current system is primarily unfunded; current and future 
workers are paying for the benefits given to the initial generations starting in the 1940s 
who had not contributed much before getting benefits.  Rather than getting low returns, 
as they would under the current system, workers receive negative matches on their 
contributions and then receive market rates of return on balances in their accounts.31 
The match rates are positive for young workers and negative for middle-aged and old 
workers.  The average match rate is lower for the old for two reasons.  First, under the 
rapid accrual rule, a given relative wage contribution generates less PAAWs the higher 
is PBAL, and PBAL rises with age, as we saw in Figure 3.  Second, the 35-year 
averaging formula means that earnings in the 36th year and beyond accrue PAAWs 
only by the amount they exceed the 35th highest relative wage to date, so that an extra 
year of work generates fewer additional PAAWs than it would if the worker had not yet 
worked 35 years.  (This second effect is not relevant for the marginal match rate in 
Figure 11, because relative wages in later years are greater than or equal to the 35th 
highest, so that an extra hour of work generates the full PAAWs increment.)  These 
factors are only partially offset by the fact that, as we saw in Figure 8, the price of a 
PAAW rises with age.   
We agree with our discussant Jason Furman that it would be desirable for our 
match rate to inform each worker directly and simply about his incentives to work. 
Feldstein and Samwick (1992) estimated the implicit tax rate on labor income (or the 
extent of the work disincentive) due to the U.S. Social Security system, i.e. the 
difference between the incremental contribution and the present value of the 
incremental lifetime benefits due to a dollar increase in current income.32   They found it 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
31 Consistent with Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1998), this negative match combined with market 
returns corresponds to the lower-than-market rate of return received overall under the current system.   
32 When earnings are stochastic, as opposed to deterministic, computing the incentive to work becomes 
much more complicated, because one needs to incorporate the different possible earnings paths, and the 
slope of the benefit schedule and the marginal utility of consumption under each path. The Feldstein and 
Samwick calculations of the lifetime marginal tax rate of social security do not incorporate this uncertainty 
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to be much higher for the young than for the old.33   This might seem to contradict our 
generally declining marginal match rates in Figure 11 (a positive match corresponds to 
a negative tax), but this is not the case, because the marginal match rates in Figure 11 
do not give an accurate guide to the implicit marginal tax rate on labor income.  Workers 
who want an accurate assessment of the incentive to work under the fastest accrual 
rule must make a more complicated dynamic calculation.  Earning more when young 
may accrue many PAAWs (which the match rate reveals), but the resulting increase in 
PBAL lowers future match rates.  Hence for young workers the true incentive to work is 
much lower than the marginal match rate in Figure 11 suggests.34 
  Under the assumption that relative wages do not vary too much over a worker’s 
lifetime, the marginal match rate from our second accrual method – the “straight-line 
method” – is proportional to the implicit marginal tax rate on labor due to social 
security.35  The marginal match rate under the straight line method therefore conveys 
the correct incentive to work, without requiring any dynamic adjustment.  Workers’ 
account statements could include either the value of the marginal match rate directly or 
the inputs needed to compute it.  The greater correspondence under this second 
accrual method between the match rate and the incentive to work represents an 
additional advantage of using the “straight-line” accrual instead of the “fastest” accrual 
method.    
Figure 12 and 13 show the average and marginal match rates under this straight-
line accrual method, and compares them to those under the fastest accrual method.  A 
worker with constant relative earnings (such as worker 1) will get the same PAAW 
allocation per relative wage contribution all through his life (recall figure 6).  Since 
                                                                                                                                                             
– their calculations simply assume that workers will end up on a specific segment of the PIA schedule 
with certainty 
 
33 Cushing (2005) showed that the decline largely disappears once one takes into account disability and 
survivor benefits. 
 
34 We are grateful to Jason Furman for bringing the importance of this issue to our attention, thereby 
directing our focus toward the “straight line” accrual rule. 
 
35 Formally, the worker’s average relative earnings to date must put the worker in the same bracket (the 
range across which the slope in figure 1b is constant) as his average relative earnings at the end of his 
career.  Under this assumption, the implicit marginal tax rate from social security equals -1 times the 
marginal match rate from the straight line method times the social security contribution rate. Note that the 
 
 
30
PAAW values rise as a worker ages (and survives), the match rate is steadily increasing 
for this worker, i.e. a worker who always earns the same relative wage will have 
increasing incentive to work an extra hour as he gets older.36  The average match rate 
for the economy wide average worker starts out around negative 40%, meaning that for 
every dollar of contributions he gets 60 cents of benefits.  Since contributions are about 
10% of wages, this means he faces an average tax rate on wages of around 4%.  Since 
the system is progressive, his marginal tax rate is higher than his average tax rate.  As 
the worker ages, the tax eventually turns into a slight subsidy. 
 
VI. Incorporating budget balance mechanisms into Progressive Personal 
Accounts 
In this section, we show that our proposed system can be modified to incorporate 
a market-based aggregate self-correction mechanism.  There is a variety of ways to do 
this.  Here we focus on one in particular, in which we balance the system “on the way 
in”, meaning that in any year the aggregate quantity of newly-issued PAAWs is set such 
that their market value equals the aggregate value of new contributions.  Assuming that 
we start with an initially balanced system (and we describe possible ways to transition to 
this), then the government should be able to optimally manage its portfolio to hedge its 
exposure and maintain balance “on the way out” as well.  
A. Transition 
The first step is to recognize that in a pay-as-you-go system, the early 
generations are given a huge windfall transfer.  Retirees in the 1940s collected Social 
Security benefits even though they hardly made any contributions.  Similarly, retirees in 
the 1950s collected benefits even though they had only contributed for 10 or 15 years, 
and so on.37 In a pay-as-you go system, current and future generations of workers are 
                                                                                                                                                             
marginal incentive to work is the same under both accrual methods (while the marginal match rate is not). 
36  The assumption in the previous footnote holds for workers 1 and 3 in Figure 13, and thus the marginal 
match rate under this accrual method exactly captures the true incentive to work. For workers 2 and 4, 
final average earnings turn out to be sufficiently higher than cumulative average earnings when young, to 
put workers in a higher Figure 1b bracket than is used for computing the contemporaneous match rate.  
In this case, the annual match rate when young does not correspond to the incentive to work. 
 
37 See Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1999) 
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called upon to pay off those transfers.  But why should this debt overhang be borne by 
those least able to pay? 
One approach would be to move rapidly to a new system by issuing “recognition 
PAAWs” to current workers and retirees to compensate for (i.e. recognize) past social 
security contributions.  These would be obligations of the United States government, 
and not of future social security contributors.  Goss, Wade, and Schultz (2008) calculate 
that the “maximum transition cost” (as of the beginning of 2007) would be $16.7 trillion.  
Ignoring risk adjustments, this provides an estimate of the market value of the required 
recognition PAAWs.  There is no reason that the burden of this debt, created by the 
transfers to the early generations of Social Security beneficiaries, should be apportioned 
based solely on “covered” labor earnings.  Payments of interest and principal on the 
recognition bonds would therefore come both from issuing new debt (i.e. rolling some of 
it over) and from taxes on all income, including labor income above the social security 
earnings cap and capital income.  Using a back-of-the envelope calculation, we 
estimate that this burden would amount to about a 1 percentage point increase in the 
tax rates on personal income and corporate profits in perpetuity.38 
Because the current system does not legally ensure property rights on accrued 
benefits, it might also be appropriate to give workers fewer recognition PAAWs than 
would be implied by the accrual rule chosen for new contributions.  By making this 
reduction for current generations, the government would reduce the future tax rates it 
would have to levy on future generations.  There is a compelling case for such a 
reduction.  The current system of taxes and legislated benefits is not in fiscal balance, 
and the shortfall has to be borne by somebody.  There seems no reason to exclude the 
current generations from bearing any of these costs.  Under our plan future workers 
would have to pay a tax on the order of 1%, or about 10% above their normal social 
                                                 
38 To obtain this estimate, we solve for the perpetual tax on personal income and profits that would be 
equal in present value to $16.7 trillion, the SSA Office of Actuary’s estimate of the 2007 “maximum 
transition cost” measure of unfunded obligations (UO).  In formula, we need to solve for t such that (t * Y) 
/ (r-g) = $16.7 trillion, where t is the tax rate, r is the real interest rate, and g is the growth rate of income 
(GDP).  This implies that t = (UO/Y)*(r-g).  Based on the 2008 OASDI Trustees Report long-term forecast, 
we assume a constant future real interest rate of 2.9% and future real income growth of 2.1%.  Given 
combined 2007 personal income and corporate profits of about $13.3 trillion, our assumptions imply a tax 
burden of 1%. Note that these calculations do not incorporate any risk adjustment of the sort proposed in 
Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2008). 
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security tax.  It seems fair to ask the current generations to accept a 10% reduction in 
their social security benefits, especially since we will be locking in property rights to 
these benefits.  If we thought current benefits were still too large, or that the resulting 
tax in perpetuity was still too high, we could reduce these benefits even more. 
 
B. A fully funded social security system 
Once this debt overhang is taken out of the social security system, there is no 
reason the system cannot operate in fiscal balance going forward, as a fully funded 
(“pre-funded”) system.  We are thus led to propose a modification of the current benefits 
rules which has the virtue of balancing the system “on the way in”.  While the 
government match under a system that maintains “balance on the way in” will by 
necessity alter the redistribution / risk sharing of the current system, we propose to keep 
such changes to a minimum.  
On average, the present value of the social security contributions a cohort makes 
under the current system is slightly greater than the present value of the benefits 
mandated by current law.  Thus workers could be made to buy their benefits via their 
contributions without having to increase contributions or reduce future benefits.  We 
propose modifying the accrual rules, so that in every year the market value of PAAWs 
awarded is just equal to the market value of all social security tax contributions.  This 
aspect is similar to what occurs with standard defined contribution accounts.   
There are many ways to structure the government match such that the overall 
budget balances on the way in.  Here we focus on one simple possibility.  For each year 
t let the preliminary allocation of PAAWs be established exactly as in the current system 
described in the previous section, say under the straight-line method of accrual.  
Compute the total market value of this allocation in the PAAWs markets.  Next, define λt 
as the ratio of total annual tax contributions in t to the market value of the preliminary 
PAAW allocation above.  The final allocation of PAAWs is set by multiplying the 
preliminary allocation by λt.  This will result in an allocation of PAAWs that exactly 
balances the budget.  The government match will then be the difference for each 
individual between the value of his final allocation of PAAWs and his tax contribution. 
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Once the legacy tax is taken out and the PAAWs are scaled up to equal current 
contributions, the government match rate looks much more generous.  In Figures 14 
and 15 we display the average and marginal government match rates (respectively) that 
incorporate this budget balancing (for each accrual rule) for each of our four 
representative workers.  Values for λt are calculated using the assumption that the 
cross-sectional age-income profile is flat (panel 1) or equivalent to the cohort-average 
time profile (panels 2-4.)  Figure 14 shows that average match rates are generally 
above zero for the cohort average worker under straight-line accrual.  Note in Figure 15 
that, for straight-line accrual, marginal match rates are (weakly) less than average 
match rates, and typically below zero for all but low earners.39   
This revised budget balance system will be similar to the current system, but it 
cannot replicate it exactly.  For example, we noted that the aggregate accruals in any 
year of the current system are independent of the aggregate contributions during that 
year.  In the budget balance system, the aggregate accruals would move dollar for 
dollar with contributions. 
 Another difference is that in this revised system, the quantity of PAAW accruals 
in a year depends on the market price of PAAWs in that year, whereas in the current 
system it does not.  In the current system, the number of PAAWs a worker gets is 
independent of interest rates.  In the budget balance system, when long run interest 
rates fall relative to the long run expected growth in wages, PAAW prices will rise, and 
workers will therefore get fewer PAAWs.40  
 
C. Maintaining balance through hedging 
Since PAAWs promise future payments that are uncertain as of the time they are 
issued, their eventual value may diverge from their original price.  Thus a system in 
balance on the way in may fall out of balance later.  So we suggest that there is a need 
for a hedging entity to keep the system in balance.  One possibility is to create a 
                                                 
39 The wedge between marginal and average match rates exists because workers earn additional benefits 
each year even if they have no additional earnings, which boosts the average match rate but not the 
marginal match rate.  This wedge will exist for "straight-line" accrual with any concave benefit schedule. 
 
40 A complete analysis of intergenerational risk sharing would have to take into account interest rate risk 
in addition to wage risk. 
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government agency with this responsibility.  Another complementary possibility would 
be to involve the private sector in issuing PAAWs that would be sold to households, i.e. 
pay firms to take on the obligations.  As described earlier, the private firms would of 
course need to be regulated and monitored to ensure that they fully collateralized their 
obligations.  We leave a full description of this hedging for future work.  
 
VII.  Conclusions and future research 
We showed that it is possible to preserve the redistribution and risk sharing of the 
current system in a system of progressive personal accounts, clarifying the link between 
contributions and benefits, and at the same time enhancing the property rights of the 
system.  Along the way, we translated the current DB system into the language of DC – 
facilitating communication in the debate over individual accounts.  
We developed a variable match approach to provide progressivity based on 
lifetime (rather than annual) income.  This approach could also be used to modify 
standard personal accounts (holding traditional financial assets) or notional defined 
contribution accounts that have recently been adopted in a number of other countries. 
We argued that it would be possible to create and trade pools of PAAWs, 
providing an estimate of the market value of each individual's account and opening up 
the possibility of allowing (limited) trade in accounts.  These new markets would have 
an enormously beneficial impact on the current annuities and reverse mortgage 
markets. 
We emphasized the importance of making the social security system self-
balancing by incorporating a market-based aggregate self-correction mechanism.  We 
described one possible way to do this through “balancing on the way in” and system 
hedging.   
This paper lays the groundwork for our ongoing and future work in this area.  In 
Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2008), we present a model for estimating PAAW prices under 
risk aversion, taking into account a long-run link between aggregate labor earnings and 
the value of the stock market.   We then use these prices to calculate the market value 
of aggregate outstanding U.S. Social Security benefit promises.  Our resulting estimates 
of the “maximum transition cost” measure of system obligations are significantly lower 
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than those of the Social Security administration, due to our incorporation of market risk 
into the discounting of future benefits.  
In other work, we are trying to further improve the risk-sharing and redistribution 
features of our progressive personal accounts, and we are also examining alternative 
market-based self-correction mechanisms. We are working to spell out in more detail 
how our proposed market for PAAWs and related new securities would operate in 
practice.  Finally, we hope to investigate the relevance of progressive personal accounts 
to private pension plans. 
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Additional PAAWs Per Additional Contribution 
(measured in average wage units)
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Figure 4 
Change in PAAW Balances
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Figure 5 
PAAW Balances (PBAL)
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Figure 6 
PBAL Under Two Accrual Methods 
(for a worker with relative earnings of 1.75 for all ages)
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Figure 7 
PBAL Under Two Accrual Methods
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Figure 8 
Projected market price of one PAAW 
(under risk neutrality, measured in average wage units)
Price rises with age because:
• r > growth of average wages
• probability of survival to retirement rises with age
Figure 9 
Projected Market Value of Accrued PAAWs 
(measured in average wage units)
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Figure 10 
Average Match Rate
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Figure 11 
Marginal Match Rate
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Figure 12 
Average Match Rate Under Two Accrual Methods
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Figure 13 
Marginal Match Rate Under Two Accrual Methods
Worker 1: Economy Average
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64
Age
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
"Fastest"
Accrual Method
"Straight Line"
Accrual Method
Relative Wage
Worker 2: Cohort Average
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62
Age
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
Worker 3: 0.5 Cohort Average
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62
Age
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
Worker 4: 1.5 Cohort Average
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62
Age
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
Figure 14 
Average Match Rates Under Automatic Balance
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Figure 15 
Marginal Match Rates Under Automatic Balance
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